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Infrastructure investment is a central part of the stimulus 
plans of the Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) 
region as it confronts the growing financial crisis. 
This paper estimates the potential effects on direct, 
indirect, and induced employment for different types 
of infrastructure projects with LAC-specific variables. 
The analysis finds that the direct and indirect short-term 
employment generation potential of infrastructure capital 
investment projects may be considerable—averaging 
around 40,000 annual jobs per US$1billion in LAC, 
depending upon such variables as the mix of subsectors 
in the investment program; the technologies deployed; 
local wages for skilled and unskilled labor; and the 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Development Department’s Economics Unit, Latin American and the Caribbean 
Region—is part of a larger effort a larger effort to understand the role of infrastructure investment on short-term and 
long-term growth. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors 
may be contacted via email at jschwartz3@worldbank.org, landres@worldbank.org, and gdragoiu@worldbank.org.
degrees of leakages to imported inputs. While these 
numbers do not account for substitution effect, they 
are built around an assumed “basket” of investments 
that crosses infrastructure sectors most of which are 
not employment-maximizing. Albeit limited in scope, 
rural road maintenance projects may employ 200,000 
to 500,000 annualized direct jobs for every US$1billion 
spent. The paper also describes the potential risks to 
effective infrastructure investment in an environment 
of crisis including sorting and planning contradictions, 
delayed implementation and impact, affordability, and 
corruption.Crisis in Latin America:  Infrastructure Investment, 
Employment and the Expectations of Stimulus
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Most of the OECD countries have announced fiscal packages that throw a wide safety net around 
their economies by attempting to salvage failing strategic businesses, relieve stress on mortgage 
holders, reduce taxes, provide credits or cash transfers to the poor, and shore up commercial 
banks, insurers and other hemorrhaging financial institutions.  In parallel to those efforts which 
are aimed at preventing further financial failures and increasing liquidity in the face of a sharp 
drop in commercial lending, governments are also focusing on economic stimulus through public 
spending—particularly through infrastructure investment.
2
                                                 
2 For a summary of recently proposed stimulus packages, see ECLAC (2009).  
  This investment-driven response to 
crisis  has revived a decades-old debate about the costs and benefits of injections of public 
resources into an economy as it enters recession.   
 
As of February 2009, the largest economies in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have 
announced similar stimulus packages that commit governments to increase spending on public 
works in general, and infrastructure in particular.  Although some of the programs may include 
investments in public housing and edifices, to date the majority of the projects and programs 
announced focus on the core infrastructure sectors of transport, water and sanitation, and energy.  
While discussions continue about the effects of these investments on short-term aggregate 
demand,  governments across the political spectrum show a remarkable proclivity toward 
infrastructure investment as a stimulus response.  Since well-targeted cash transfers may be found 
to induce consumption effectively and quickly in comparison to expenditure programs, the 
reasons for the commitment to infrastructure investment as a crisis response tool are worth 
considering.  
 
At one level, the attractiveness of infrastructure investment may be compared to renting versus 
purchasing a home.  While a cash transfer may appear the general population to be a temporary 
expenditure that produces no visible results, construction activities result in tangible outputs such 
as a road, a power plant or an irrigation system.  Perhaps even more important to policy makers 
than the lasting assets—or long-term growth benefits—of the infrastructure being built, may be 
the perception of fairness and productivity that comes with public expenditure on employment 
activity as opposed to welfare.   While this rationale may have more political value than 
economic value, the employment generation potential of the proposed investments remain a 
central feature of their attractiveness.  This is particularly important as LAC’s unemployment 
levels rise in the face of the growing crisis.  This note provides a preliminary estimate of the 
employment generation potential for different types of infrastructure investments as per the LAC 
stimulus packages. 
 
The packages announced by the major economies of the LAC region reflect this emphasis on 
stimulus through employment generation.  In light of the dire need for greater economic activity 
and the growing hope being placed on stimulus via public works and infrastructure investment, 
this paper intends to edify the discussion about the real potential for such investments to stimulate 
growth, both in the short and the long term.  The paper will present an estimate of the value of 
LAC’s stimulus packages. We will summarize what we know about the expected impacts of 
infrastructure investments by differentiating among: i)  short-term impacts of infrastructure 
investment on employment including “red flags” associated with using infrastructure as a tool for 
combating recession, (such as sorting and planning contradictions, corruption risks; 
implementation delays, and affordability challenges); ii) short-term impacts of stimulus 




2. Latin America and the Caribbean’s Stimulus Packages 
 
As of February 2009, the largest economies in LAC have had announced stimulus packages that 
commit governments to increase spending on public works.
3  The programs range in size from 0.4 
percent to 1.6 percent of each country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Extrapolating these 
commitments
4 to the region as a whole suggests that governments in the region plan to invest an 
additional $25 billion in 2009 in public works —which is about 20 percent beyond the originally 
planned budget allocations.  This represents an additional  0.5 to 1.0 percent of GDP in 
commitments in public works, raising public capital spending levels to somewhere between 3.0 to 
4.0 percent of GDP for the region as a whole.
5
Table 1:  Stimulus Plans for LAC, 2009 
 
 
Table 1 below summarizes the region’s major commitments to economic stimulus that have been 
announced in recent weeks and the estimation of region-wide investment levels.  The five 
countries included in the table represent over 75 percent of the region’s population and GDP. 
 
 
Source:  UNECLAC (2009), IMF, National Legislation Data, Consensus Economics (2009), and Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Many countries have proposed multiyear packages.  These estimates capture the additional investments in public 
work to be implemented in 2009 in addition to the budget proposed previously for the year 2009.  (*) For LAC’s 
estimates, we extrapolated the figures to those countries without information. 
 
There is a multi-faceted relevance to the region’s decision to sustain or even grow its investment 
levels in infrastructure in the face of a financial crisis.  First, it represents a break with historical 
practice.  In past financial crises, major LAC countries have paid for the largest share of their 
fiscal rebalancing out of capital investment in infrastructure.
6
                                                 
3 Public Works, in this case, refers to infrastructure investments in transport, energy and water as well as 
public housing and public edifices such as schools and hospitals.  The division of expenditure expected 
among categories and sub-sectors is still unclear in many of the pronouncements. 
4 Despite our efforts to review all the countries in the region, the information was significant fragment 
when available. In any case, the countries with available information cover 80 percent of the LAC’s GDP. 
5 In recent years, the LAC Region has seen additional investments in infrastructure from private sector 
sources totaling between 1 and 2 percent of GDP per year.  This range includes telecommunications 
investments which are mostly private throughout the region but does not include private housing stock 
Serven and Calderon (2004b). 
6 Calderon, Easterly, and Servén (2004). 
  This time, many LAC countries 
have developed a modest scope for countercyclical fiscal policy and they are using it. Although 
all capital expenditures (including infrastructure, housing, public buildings, schools, jails, and 
hospitals) represent an average of 20 to 25 percent of total expenditures (i.e. capital, interest and 
non-interest current expenditures) in LAC, nearly 50 percent of fiscal rebalancing was taken out 
of the infrastructure sub-components of capital expenditure in the 1990s.  Second, it represents an 
opportunity to correct for a tradition of under-investment in infrastructure as a share of GDP that 
Ratio Stimulus vs
Total Investment
$B % GDP $B % GDP
Argentina 4.4 1.6% 17.1 6.1% 25.7%
Brazil 6.7 0.5% 23.3 1.7% 28.8%
Chile 0.7 0.4% 4.7 2.7% 15.0%
Mexico 6.9 0.8% 43.6 4.8% 15.8%
Peru 1.6 1.3% 5.8 4.6% 27.6%
LAC (*) 25 0.5% to 1.0% 125 3% to 4% 20%
(*) For the LAC estimates, we extrapolated the figures to those countries without information.
2009 Stimulus Pkg




has characterized the region’s spending habits in recent decades and explained, in part, the 
declining competitiveness vis-à-vis East Asian economies.   
 
The decision to increase infrastructure investment at the outset of a financial crisis illustrates a 
venture into the policy realm of stimulus via public investment—even as low commodity prices 
affected reserves around the region.  This may test the limits of the region’s rapidly declining 
fiscal space and rapidly increasing cost of capital.  Finally, the reaction of the public sector may 
be viewed as more realistic with regards to outside sponsorship of projects.  Whereas the last 
response to crisis was to expect the private sector to compensate for decreasing public 
expenditures, it is now clear that the public’s retreat was never replaced in the 1990s.   
 
While the World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Database finds the rate of 
private project closure in LAC to be lower in the last quarter of 2008 than in the same period in 
2007, an overall decline in the trend of private deals coming to closure is not yet detectable.  
Project Finance’s DealLogic Database, which tracks private flows into all infrastructure projects, 
shows little change quarter to quarter up through the end of 2008.  Despite this uneven overall 
rising and slight 1-quarter decline, interviews with IFC and banking staff working in the region 
suggest that private projects are just now beginning to freeze and that debt financing is simply 
unavailable  for  most  projects.  While first quarter 2009 data show continued growth in 
infrastructure finance, projects appear to be concentrating in fewer countries and fewer sectors. 
Nearly all investments by value have been in Brazil hydropower projects.  There have been 
practically no utility-level investments in the region, no water sector investements and decreasing 
transport sector investments as well, aside from the expansion of the Panama Canal which closed 
in Q42008.
7   The expectation is that PPI levels will drop considerably through the rest of  2009 
in LAC as they have in every other region of the world.
8
Figure 1: Private Financing to LAC Infrastructure, Quarterly from 2004 to 2008  
   
 
 
Source: DealLogic Database, Project Finance, Authors’ Calculations 
 
                                                 
7 Projectware Database, Dealogic, as of April 2009. 
8 See also Izaguirre (2009) which identifies a modest decrease in quarter to quarter PPI projects in LAC 










































































































































































LAC US$ Mill (excluding commodity-oriented
infra and Panama)
4 per. Mov. Avg. (LAC US$ Mill (excluding
commodity-oriented infra and Panama)) 
5 
In the absence of a significantly higher and better diversified private sector response, the question 
remains what stimulus effects will be gained by the planned public investments, and whether the 
initiatives will be sufficient and appropriate for governments to meet their objectives  in 
combating the crisis.  In order to assess the potential impact of these investments, it is necessary 
to define the form of economic stimulus that should be expected from the investments.  The 
following sections look at what is known about the impact of infrastructure investment on short-
term employment generation; the impact of public expenditure stimulus on short-term growth; 
and the impact of infrastructure investment on long-term growth and other development factors. 
 
 
3.  The Impact of Infrastructure Investment on Short-Term Employment generation 
 
While little consensus exists about the likely effects of a surge in public investment on short-term 
growth, there is one sub-component of the growth equation that can be estimated with greater 
confidence:  the impact of infrastructure investment on short-term employment generation.  The 
most comprehensive way to calculate the labor impacts of a single infrastructure investment or 
project is to consider three levels of impact stemming from an investment
9
1.  Crowding Out and Substitution Effects:  The risk of crowding out the private sector and 
“supporting” employment rather than creating incremental jobs is as relevant for this 
analysis as it is for an analysis of stimulus effects on growth
: i) Primary Impact:  
Those directly employed on site to undertake the task at hand; ii) Secondary Impact:  Those 
indirectly employed in the manufacture of materials and equipment as a result of the initial 
investment; and  iii)  Tertiary  Impact: The induced employment generated by the direct and 
indirect jobs created. This includes all of the jobs supported by consumer expenditures resulting 
from wages in the two previous levels. 
 
This is a much simpler calculation than the proof or disproof of a Keynesian growth multiplier 
since it is built up from a single project or type of investment and focuses on jobs, rather than 
final growth outcomes. 
 
As an example of how this works, a one-year water supply expansion project that requires 10 
people digging holes and laying pipes would create 10 direct jobs.  The manufacturing and 
mobilization of the pipes they lay and equipment they use might be calculated to require 10 more 
indirect or “secondary” jobs.  If the propensity to consume of those 10 direct and 10 indirect 
employees creates 20 more indirect jobs among shopkeepers, farmers, and other service and 
goods providers, then the multiplier of the direct jobs might be calculated as 3.0 (i.e., 30 indirect 
and induced jobs generated for 10 direct jobs funded).  Policy makers may look to those 
multipliers to prioritize—or justify—the investment in proposed projects and programs. 
 
The risks of overstating impact with these multipliers are considerable, however.  Here are some 
“red flags” to consider when calculating labor impacts of investments: 
 
10
2.  Local Supply versus Imports:  Secondary effects may be limited by the need to import 
inputs to construction (e.g., steel, transport equipment, heavy machinery or even energy 
inputs).  To the degree that these inputs come from neighboring countries or other 
.  The possibility that the 
skill requirements for a new investment do not match against the roster of unemployed in 
a particular country or sub-region would further confine the multiplier. 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Heintz and Pollin (2009), and Romer and Bernstein (2009).  
10 See Coenen and Straub (2005) for a discussion and references to many other contributions.  
6 
developing countries, they might still be considered of multiplicative value to a regional 
or global institution although will likely be of little interest to a government counterpart. 
3.  Opportunity Cost:  Any social transfer of resources (not just employment generation from 
works) will generate Tertiary Effects.  In fact, since the propensity of the unemployed 
and the poor to consume is greater than that of the employed, direct transfers may have a 
higher multiplier than those derived indirectly from other employment-generating 
schemes.  Consumption from direct transfers may also be quicker to enter the economy 
than those generated by employment from works. 
 
Using an Input-Output Model that considers all levels of inputs to construction, the US Federal 
Highway Administration has estimated employment generated or supported from investments in 
highways.
11  Although these models have a limited ability to predict “new” employment 
generation from an economy-wide perspective, their outputs provide a sense of the potential 
range of employment generation as a result of these interventions.  According to these 
calculations, US$1billion in road construction results in 6,055 direct jobs on site and another 
7,790 in indirect jobs from material supply (Figure 2).  The greatest multiplier effect, however, is 
derived from estimates of the propensity of those workers to consume which create another nearly 
14,000 jobs.  This would mean a multiplier effect of about 2.0 for the 6,055 direct and indirect 
jobs created.  The limitations of the model are important to consider as these ratios are applied to 
Latin America and the Caribbean or other developing regions: i)  More than half of the 
employment generation and two-thirds of the multiplier is derived from tertiary effects and are 
thus based on assumptions about consumption that do not consider the opportunity cost of the 
original  investment;
12
                                                 
11  JOBMOD2.1: A Comprehensive Model for Estimating Employment Generation from Federal-Aid 
Highway Projects (2006). Boston University Center for Transportation Studies under subcontract to 
Battelle Memorial Institute for U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration Office 
of Transportation Policy Studies  See also Weels (2008) for more  recent results of this model. 
12 The Obama Administration is anticipating 3.6 million jobs created out of their stimulus package which 
includes $170 billion in public works.  This calculates to 8,500 jobs per US$1 billion in works—a third of 
the USFHWA estimates for primary and secondary effects of highway construction, mainly due a 
composition of labor intensive public works (highways) and projects that are less labor intensive (energy).  
That is, the US Government stimulus package seems to have discounted deeply the expectation of induced 
employment generation in calculating the impact of its works program. 
  ii)  Substitution effects are not considered; and  iii)  The model is run 
“nationally” for the US and thus assumes no importation of construction equipment or material. 
 
Keeping in mind the shortcomings of these calculations—and adjusting for them with available 
data from LAC on wages, leakages by sub-sector, and skilled and unskilled labor divisions—the 
approach to calculating direct and indirect jobs may provide a basis for estimating the 
employment generation potential of investments in all areas of infrastructure in countries outside 
of the US.  A review of project documents, IEG reports, and sectoral ESW provides a sufficient 
starting point for this analysis with information about construction costs and direct employment 
levels for a variety of infrastructure projects across Latin America. By assigning wage 
assumptions to workers according to skill sets, estimating domestic and foreign content for both 
materials and equipment, a levelized set of results in terms of direct employment can be 
calculated for a given sum of money expended—in this case US$1billion.   
  
7 
Figure 2:  Direct and Indirect Employment Resulting from US$1B in Highway Spending by 
the US Federal Government According to US Department of Transportation (2008) 
 
 
Source:  Own calculations based on the DOTMOD2 model from the US Federal Highway Administration and Wells 
(2008). 
 
Table 2 provides the results for Annual Direct Employment per US$1Billion spent. The most 
important result of this summary analysis is that the range of direct employment impacts is 
tremendous:  from 750 direct jobs per US$1billion spent on coal-fired generation projects to 
100,000 direct jobs for water supply and sanitation network expansion.  In addition, the direct 
employment generation potential of an investment is thus highly sensitive to: assumptions about 
wages; the division between skilled and unskilled workers; the sectoral allocation of the proposed 
program; the technology to be employed in each project; and the potential crowding-out or 
substitution effects. Indirect job estimates are also highly sensitive to leakage created from the 
division between locally produced versus imported inputs. 
 
Table 2:  Employment Levels for Representative Infrastructure Capital Investment Projects 
in LAC, by Country and Sub-sector 
 
 
Note: [*] These estimates are based on an hourly wage of $3 for non qualified workers and $6 for qualified ones for 
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Colombia - Access to neigborhoods (streets) 15% 6% 49% 16% 14% 100% 22,500
Colombia - Feeder routes for Transmilenio 27% 23% 6% 99% 35,833
Brazil - Roads 3% 9% 22% 63% 3% 100% 16,577
Argentina- Rosario - highways 1.3% 0.3% 60% 38% 0% 100% 1,650
Water and Sanitation
Honduras - Improvement on water captation 28% 12% 40% 20% 100% 43,333
Honduras - Rehabilatation of water networks 30% 20% 40% 10% 100% 58,333
Honduras - Expansion of water networks 20% 30% 40% 10% 100% 66,667
Honduras - New treatment plant 10% 10% 80% 0% 100% 25,000
Colombia - Expansion of WSS networks 8% 56% 32% 4% 100% 100,000
Brazil - Rain Drainage networks 8% 16% 48% 28% 0% 100% 34,001
Brazil - Sewerage 4% 11% 68% 17% 0% 100% 21,746
Energy
US - Solar PV 3%-5% 100% 2,700
US - Wind Power 4%-6% 100% 3,400
US - Biomass 1%-2% 100% 700
US - Coal-fired 1%-2% 100% 750
US - Natural gas-fired 2%-4% 100% 1,700
Brazil - Hydropower 5%-10% 100% 4,500









Source:  World Bank project documents: Honduras - Water and Sanitation Program (P103881), Colombia - Bogota 
Urban Services Project (P074726), Brazil - Bahia Poor Urban Areas Integrated Dev (P081436), Argentina - Santa Fe 
Road Infrastructure (P099051), and Brazil - Cana Brava hydropower plant. Energy estimates are from the UNEP 
(2008), Peru - Rural Electrification (P090116), and Brazil - Cana Brava hydropower plant. Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
With those sensitivities in mind, a “prototypical  basket” of infrastructure investment
13
The estimates presented in Table 2 correspond to capital investment projects in various countries 
across the LAC region.  There is a sub-set of infrastructure projects, which, however limited in 
scope, may provide the opportunity for even greater direct employment benefits.  That is, rural 
road maintenance programs typically
 
implemented in LAC weighted would generate about 40,000 new direct and indirect jobs per 
US$1billion spent.  Even with an assumed multiplier of 2.0 for further induced employment and 
no crowding out or substitution effect, this would mean employment generation of about 80,000 
jobs per US$1billion spent or 2 million jobs for the incremental US$25 billion so far proposed as 
stimulus in 2009 in the LAC region.  This would represent about 7 percent of LAC’s estimated 
unemployed in 2009. 
 
14 invest up to 90 percent of the total project costs in labor 
activities.  Regional data suggest that between 200 and 500 jobs are created for every million 
dollar spent on these  initiatives  by employing  unskilled  workers in rural areas paid at the 
minimum wage.
15
                                                 
13 Based on proposed stimulus packages, we assumed a composition of packages as: 50% in Transport 
(25% in highways, 20% in urban roads, and 5% in rural roads), 30% in Electricity (25% in generation of 
electricity and 5% in rural electrification), and 20% in Water and Sanitation (15% in coverage expansion 
and 5% in treatment plants). We simulated different composition and the estimations were significantly 
robust. 
14 Peru - Second Rural Roads Project (P044601) and Guatemala - Second Rural and Main Roads Project 
(P055085). 
15 As with investments in assets, these numbers do not account for substitution effect.  As such, the 
estimates may be most applicable to economies with slack labor conditions and unemployment among day 
laborers and construction workers in particular. 
  The jobs generated from labor intensive maintenance projects would generate 
very few indirect jobs because of the lack of material and equipment inputs.  Nevertheless, labor 
intensive projects coupled with well-targeted social programs may be considered a highly 
progressive intervention for reducing the impact of the crisis on poor rural communities.   
 
In advising governments on the design of stimulus plans, it becomes clear that the employment 
story is complex and the investment decision should be made in the context of the overall 
objective of the government in the medium to long term.  To illustrate how nuanced policy 
recommendation would need to be in the context of employment generation, the Diagram below 
illustrates the wide range of employment effects according to different renewable energy 
technologies and juxtaposes those effects against highway construction.   
  
9 
Figure 3:  Estimates of Total Employment Benefits by Types of Intervention for each US$ 
Billion Invested, by Sub-sector of Infrastructure 
 
Sources:  Authors calculations, World Bank project documents, RDEL (2009) and USDOT. 
 
Beyond the variant labor results, fast and significant expansion of infrastructure investments 
presents important practical  challenges to the efficiency and the efficacy of investment.  A 
shortlist of these challenges might include: Sorting and planning  contradictions,  Delayed 
disbursement and impact, Affordability of these packages, and Corruption risk. 
 
Sorting and Planning Contradictions:  Under political duress and time constraints, governments 
may not make the most logical decisions related to investments and prioritization.  Infrastructure 
investments often contain complementarities (e.g., modes of transport assets along a supply 
chain) or substitution effects (e.g., rail versus road for transport or gas versus electricity supply 
for heating).  They might also contain contradictory character traits intended to meet different 
objectives.  For example, a stimulus program that seeks both environmental sustainability and 
reduced emissions might struggle to accommodate both goals.  A road investment component 
might meet employment goals, but could contribute to automobilization and higher carbon 
emissions in the long-term.  A renewable energy program or light rail component might meet 
environmental objectives but may not demonstrate significant employment benefits given the 
high import components.  Federated countries have the exacerbation of competing projects in 
different jurisdictions that rely on the same foundation for demand.  Regional ports (particularly 
down the eastern coast of Latin America where there is an overabundance of natural harbors), 
secondary airports and hydroelectric facilities feeding a national grid are all at risk of this 
redundancy.  On the other hand, long-term and short-term goals need not be mutually exclusive.  
Programs that strengthen existing road networks through rehabilitation and maintenance 
programs, but also finance increased access to electricity, water and sanitation through network 
expansions may combine both long-term growth objectives with short-term employment 
benefits—all with minimal (or positive) environmental impacts.  In energy generation, the 
construction of hydroelectric facilities typically generates 5 to 7 times the jobs of coal plants of 
equal cost.  Again, the long-term benefits—in this case, lower emissions levels and greater energy 
security—may coincide with the short-term goals of stimulus through employment generation. 
 
In order to reach these goals, the efficacy of national, regional and local planning processes is 
paramount.  Governments may wish to strengthen their capacity for ex ante project evaluation; 









































cross-sectoral convening ability; and the authority to prioritize, scale and permit projects 
according to impact analysis.
16
Affordability of the Stimuli Packages:  The potential scope, size and timing of LAC’s proposed 
stimuli packages will be determined by fiscal space—the room in a government’s budget that 
allows it to provide resources for additional projects without jeopardizing the sustainability of its 
financial position or the stability of the economy.  In other words, fiscal space must exist or be 
created if extra resources are to be made available for worthwhile government spending
 
 
Delayed Implementation and Impact:  The lifecycle of project preparation for medium or large-
scale projects is generally 1 to 3 years, although projects that are simply awaiting financing may 
be “shovel ready.” This depends upon the depth and quality of existing economic, financial and 
technical feasibility work as well as the commitment to competitive procurement practices.  If 
projects to be funded are already designed and simply awaiting financing, the timeframe may be 
significantly shorter as might maintenance and minor rehabilitation contracts.  However, it is 
possible that projects that have been sitting in pipeline will require new demand studies, updated 
cost projections or even recalibrated willingness and ability to pay analyses given the shifting 
resources of consumers and the changing prices of inputs in the crisis environment.  Moreover, 
several countries in LAC habitually disburse less than their annually expected disbursements—
typically around 75 percent of plan.  Given the importance of timeliness in generating stimulus 
effect, delays and slow disbursements would have a direct and perhaps irreversible effect on the 
impact of the project. 
 
17.  LAC’s 
proposed stimuli packages present enormous demand on the limited fiscal space in the region and 
the room for aggressive responses is heterogeneous across the region.  The challenge of creating 
fiscal space for infrastructure expenditure is that governments attempt to do so without 
compromising other usages such as safety net programs and human development interventions.  
The government must ensure that the higher expenditure in the short term, and any associated 
future expenditure—including recurrent spending on operations and maintenance triggered by 
new infrastructure capital investments or new public services—can be financed from current and 
future revenues
18
Corruption Risks:  Emergency environments often create the impetus for shortcuts, particularly 
as they relate to time-consuming safeguard practices.  In a crisis situation governments may feel 
justified in seeking to bypass lengthy procurement policies such as international competitive 
bidding, pre-qualification, and re-bidding in the case of insufficient competition or non-
responsive bids
.  For the LAC countries lacking enough fiscal room, other complementary 
policies might be necessary such as saving through expenditure rationalization and tax reform, 
and mobilization of additional resources from borrowing and grants.  More so, the current crisis 
could be an opportunity for LAC to reprioritize expenditures and rid of unproductive spending 
and unviable subsidies. Several other instruments that may help create fiscal space are: 
implementing mechanisms that boost efficiency by reducing corruption and improving 
governance. Albeit difficult during recession, raising revenues for those countries with low ratios 
of government revenue to GDP may also help to create space. 
 
19
                                                 
16 The Global Experts Team for Public Sector Management, in conjunction with LCSPS, is undertaking a 
study of best practices in the management of stimulus programs that includes a review of US and other 
OECD institutional arrangements. 
17 Heller (2005). 
18 Heller (2005). 
19 Kenny (2007). 
.  The temptation to trade time for competition raises the risk of corruption,  
11 
collusion, and public skepticism.  Rushed procurement processes run the risk of being self-
defeating and costly elements of stimulus.  
 
 
4.  The Impact of Stimulus Expenditure on Short-Term Growth – A Quick Review 
 
In LAC, as in the US and other OECD countries, the hope for economic stimulus in response to 
recession is derived from a belief that an injection of capital into an economy that is entering 
recession or depression can create economic activity through a cascading multiplier effect.  This 
section attempts merely to summarize the terms of debate surrounding short-term growth effects 
in response to stimulus expenditures during cyclical downturns.   
 
As John Maynard Keynes argued in the early 1930s, the use of a combination of two 
governmental tools—a reduction in interest rates and public investment in infrastructure—could 
lead economies out of recession.  The injection of income, in particular, would result in greater 
spending in the economy and employment generation, which in turn would stimulate more 
production and investment, creating a “multiplication” of the original investment.   
 
Later critics of Keynes’ theories argued that “crowding out” and “substitution” effects would 
deprive the investments of their intended multipliers
20
Without resolving the debate between Keynesian economists and monetarists, a number of 
studies have sought to calculate the real multiplier effect of investment programs on growth.  
Because of the variations in fiscal conditions and policies that have accompanied these programs, 
the range of multipliers derived from such programs is wide.  A recent meta-analysis done by the 
IMF shows that studies of the effect of stimulus investments on growth in advanced economies 
ranges from 0.1 to 3.1 times the investment levels.  Most expenditure multipliers are found to 
exist in the range of 0.6 to 1.4.
.  That is, the result of major new public 
sector programs would be to crowd out private sector activities and to borrow already active 
workers from gainful employment rather than create incremental jobs.  They also demonstrated 
that historical evidence of macroeconomic linkages—such as inflation and unemployment—were 
not relevant under all fiscal policies.  In effect, microeconomic models were needed to 
demonstrate the linkages between policy actions and economic activity.   
 
21
“Given the anticipated weakness in the global economy over the next two years, 
consideration should be given to providing fiscal stimulus that goes beyond the 
measures already announced.  As is clear from our simulations, either government 
investment expenditure and/or targeted transfers would have sizable multiplier 
effects on the economy.  In an ideal scenario where fiscal stimulus is both global 
and supported by monetary accommodation, and where financial sectors that are 
under pressure are being supported by governments, every dollar spent on 
   
 
The divergent views of the potential impact of stimulus packages are not limited to clashing 
historical analyses of the U.S. depression or Japanese Recession.  An IMF Staff Decision Note 
published in March 2009 summarizes the results of a global structural  modeling exercise 
conducted  by the Fund’s Research Unit.  The authors derive a multiplier of up to 3.0 from 
stimulus efforts--assuming global initiative, monetary accommodation and a focus on 
infrastructure investment and short-term targeted transfers.  The paper concludes:   
 
                                                 
20 See, for example, Booth (1983) and Chari et al (2009). 
21 See, for example Hemming et al. (2002) and Bayoumi and Sgherri (2009).  
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government investment can increase GDP by about $3, while every dollar of 
targeted transfers can increase GDP by about $1.”
22
By contrast, a Working Paper of the National Bureau of Economic Research released this month 
recalculates the US stimulus package according to a “Neo-Keynesian” construct and finds 
multiplier effects of less than 1.0 and decreasing rapidly with time.
 
   
23
In addition to the empirical research on investment and short-term growth outcomes, there is a 
growing literature in economics that incorporates the effects of consumer and firms’ behavior in 
response to government action and inaction.  While traditional economics assumes that people are 
rational and behave in a way so as to maximize their individual self-interest, behavioral 
economics points to other forms of analysis that drives people’s decisions, including heuristics—
the reliance of experience, trial-and-error and approximation, and simulation, i.e.,  not strictly 




Since any multiplier less than 1 suggests an investment with a negative return, the outcomes of 
these single models provide a difficult foundation on which to build a policy framework.  That 
said, the conclusions of the meta-analysis reveal trends among the papers that are instructive: 
Firstly, short-term multipliers are higher for spending changes than for tax changes according to 
most macro-models. Secondly, short-term multipliers are generally higher than long-term 
multipliers, reflecting crowding out effects. And finally, multipliers are higher in developing 
countries than in developed economies since the marginal propensities to consume and to invest 
are greater among the poor. 
 
The literature also suggests that multipliers will tend to be positive and possibly large when: i) 
There is high unemployment and when households are liquidity constrained;  ii)  Increased 
government spending does not substitute for private spending, but enhances the productivity of 
labor and capital;  iii)  Government debt is low and the government does not face financing 




5.  Proactivity and Short-term Stimulus 
 
24
The conclusion of the literature that considers these forces is that observed market outcomes are 
often contrary to 
 
 
rational expectations and market efficiency.  The role of “consumer confidence” 
indexes in predicting retail sales and influencing markets, for example, illustrates the importance 
of perception in driving economic activity.  Indeed, the Consumer Confidence and Consumer 
Sentiment Indexes collapsed in the middle of 2007 well in advance of the US stock markets.  
Likewise, the Consumer Sentiment Index has consistently rebounded prior to the end of recession 
periods.  The diagram below places past US recessions against consumer sentiment showing both 
the close correlation as well as the slight anticipatory nature of consumer confidence.  
 
                                                 
22 Freedman, et al (2009).  
23 Cogan, et al, (2009). 
24 Kahneman (1982).  
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Source:  St. Louis Federal Reserve Board (2009). 
 
According to behavioral economics literature, people on average perform poorly at computation 
when making decisions.  In general, they cannot calculate probabilities well, give undue weight to 
unlikely events, and are strongly influenced by the way in which problems and information are 
presented to them.
25
In light of this behavioral backdrop,  many economists are now discussing  infrastructure 
investments as important linchpins in a recovery plan.  This is not only in the expectation that 
such investments may generate capital deployment and jobs but also because they may be viewed 
more generally by consumers as a reflection of an active government and a rebounding economy.  
Highly visible infrastructure projects are generally more easily understood than other forms of 
stimulus—such as government guarantees, resources injected into the financial sector, corporate 
tax cuts or credits and other types of transfers.
  Since the major driver of stimulus effect is the expenditure’s multiplier, 
which is driven by the propensity to consume, consumers’ belief in—or skepticism about—a 
stimulus package can be, in part, a self-fulfilling prophecy.  If consumers do not believe that 
stimulus is effective, they are more like to hoard—that is, save—their money thereby reducing 
the  multiplier  effect.  Taken as a whole, therefore, the public’s reaction—be it rational or 
irrational—to the events taking place during a recession can drive the same markets that are 
meant to reflect the recession.   
 
26
The current debate about the nature of stimulus in the United States reveals evidence of this 
behavioral tendency.  The US Government’s stimulus package sets aside approximately US$170 
billion for public works.  This is a fraction of the cost of the financial bailouts, which were 
originally set at US$700 billion, but which may climb to well over a trillion dollars in cost.  
However, the amount of public interest in and discussion about the public works component of 
the stimulus package outstrips the interest in the financial bailout.
   
 
27
                                                 
25 Kahneman and Nassim (2009). 
26 Stiglitz and Feldstein (2009). 
  While it is difficult to 
27 Google’s search engine calculates that phrases related to the words “Financial Bailout” have attracted 
less than 14 million hits.  The list of all topics related to the financial bailout totals about 40 million hits.  




Figure 5:  Consumer Sentiment Index, 1975 to 2010,




calculate or forecast the relative benefits of “visibility” in stimulus planning, the political 
economy benefits of governmental concern about employment generation and pro-activity are 
self-evident as governments around the world scramble to put together stimulus packages.  More 
importantly, they may have real effects on the multipliers needed for recovery. 
 
Of course, at some level the financial markets must also respond to the government plans and 
may not wait for consumer reaction to condemn a stimulus package.  If financial markets are not 
convinced about the policies and their impact on inflation and sustainable growth, then the cost of 
capital will rise and an accommodative monetary policy will not be possible.  For this reason, the 
US Administration, for one, has been focusing on establishing a framework for accountability and 
testing performance and has even been promoting the target of a medium-term balanced budget 
despite the increased public expenditure.  These institutional arrangements and policy initiatives 
oriented toward fiscal sustainability will become increasingly relevant for LAC as the region 
seeks to assure financial markets that its stimulus packages are sustainable and not so inflationary 
that they will prohibit monetary accommodation. 
 
 
6.  Long-term Impacts of Infrastructure Investment on Growth – A Short Review 
 
While the debate about the links between stimulus spending and short-term growth continues to 
wage, the economic literature on the impact of infrastructure on long-term growth can be 
described as more decidedly positive.  A meta-analysis conducted by the Bank in 2008 that 
reviews micro and macro analyses of the impact of increases or improvements in infrastructure 
stocks (or their variations) and literature finds an overall degree of positive outcomes from the 
existing literature.  This holds for both long-run economic growth and specific factor outputs.
28
Overall,  of the 140 specifications from 64 papers considered, the  majority of the empirical 




To site specific examples,  the World Bank found in 2004  that if Latin American countries' 
infrastructure stocks were to catch up with the regional leader, they would get additional growth 
of between 1.1 percent and 4.0 percent per year.
  
Developing country data lead to positive results slightly more often than those exercises using 
data from developed economies.  These results hold true for different proxies for infrastructure, 
including  measure of public capital (i.e. investment in infrastructure, generally from public 
sources although not exclusively) or physical indicators.  Looking mostly at the public capital 
stocks of US, the macro-level literature finds very large estimates for the elasticity of 
infrastructure--between 0.20 and 0.40.  These results survive to different proxies of changes in 
infrastructure’s stock and output measures.   
 
30  The OECD also examined the relationship 
between infrastructure investment (including rehabilitation and maintenance) and GDP over time 
and across countries and found that infrastructure investment drives long-term economic output 
more than other kinds of  physical investment.  For example, investments in electricity and 
telecommunication produce an approximately 0.25 percent increase in long-term economic 
growth rates for each 10 percent of increase of service penetration.
31
                                                                                                                                                 
drawing another 30 million by itself.  To the degree that Google search is an indicator, at ¼ or 1/5 the cost, 
there appears to be about 4 or 5 times as much interest in the stimulus than the bailout. 
28  Straub (2008).  
29 A small fraction of the literature (6 percent) finds a negative relationship. 
30  Calderon and Serven (2004). 




Some micro econometric contributions have looked into the issue of infrastructure’s impact on 
development outcomes, ranging from the effect of access to roads on poverty
32 to the impact that 
electricity has on the height of babies
33
The composition of infrastructure investments:  It is not surprising that the conclusion of most 
models is that the balance between new investments vs. maintenance is likely to be sub-optimal. 
Similarly, growth models imply that lower than optimal levels of maintenance expenditures will 
generate higher operating costs, both to run the infrastructure facilities and for private capital 
goods that rely on them.  Evidence from the deterioration of rural roads in Africa shows that the 
loss of road asset values  between 1970 and 1989 was 4.5 higher  than the potential cost of 
maintenance to avoid the loss in asset value in the same period.
.  Despite a general paucity of impact evaluations of 
infrastructure interventions, the evidence demonstrates the positive implications of access and 
quality of infrastructure on productivity and welfare of the population.  
 
34
•  Planned Investment Levels:  LAC countries have so far announced about US$25 billion 
in stimulus-oriented additional public works for 2009—between 0.5 and 1.0 percent of 
GDP on average.  This increase represents about 20 percent beyond what had been 
planned.  Private flows to infrastructure had only begun to slow at the end of 2008; faster 
 
 
The quality dimension can be linked both to the composition of these investments and to the 
sequencing of the supporting reforms. As for empirical insights about the sequencing of reforms 
supporting infrastructure investment, they have been concerned with the timing of restructuring 
measures, the implementation of regulation and, if so, the institutional aspects of it, and the 





Infrastructure investment is already a central part of the stimulus plans of LAC as they confront 
the growing financial crisis.  Understanding the potential for these planned infrastructure and 
public works investments to create jobs and foster growth requires a micro-level focus.  The 
macro-analysis linking stimulus to growth is somewhat less conclusive than the micro analysis on 
infrastructure and employment generation.  At the employment level, policy makers and their 
advisers will require sector-level analysis, comparative technology analysis, and data on the 
sourcing of inputs to calculate job figures of planned investments.  In addition, in order to assure 
effectiveness of infrastructure investments in a crisis environment, governments will need to 
redouble their efforts to establish planning processes which weigh the trade-offs associated with 
multiple investments, procurement processes which are patient and robust in the face of time 
pressures; and disbursement plans which keep up with the levels of expectation.  Finally, short-
term plans for infrastructure investment will have to be viewed in the context of the long-term 
objectives of growth and poverty alleviation which remain infrastructure’s fundamental 
contribution to economic activity. 
 
The main conclusions of the analysis include the following points: 
 
                                                 
32 See, for example, Dercon et al (2007), Khandker et al (2009), Mu and van de Walle (2007), and 
Lokshin and Yemtsov (2005). 




decline is likely for 2009.  This time around, governments in LAC appear to understand 




•  Infrastructure Investment and Employment:  The employment generation potential of 
infrastructure investment may be considerable—averaging around 40,000 jobs per 
US$1billion in LAC across a mix of subsectors.  This excludes the tertiary effects of 




Albeit limited in scope, rural road maintenance projects initiated through micro-
enterprises may produce 200,000 to 500,000 direct jobs per US$1billion of 
disbursements.  Exact levels of employment generation per basket of investments are 
highly sensitive to local wages, split between skilled and unskilled labor, the sectors 
under consideration, the technology being deployed, the degree of importation of inputs, 
and substitution effect where there is limited slack in the labor market. 
•  Risks to Effective Infrastructure Investment:  A fast and significant expansion of 
infrastructure investments presents several challenges for Governments.  A shortlist of 
these challenges includes:  sorting and planning contradictions, delayed implementation 
and impact, affordability challenges of the stimuli packages, and corruption risk. 
 
•  Impact of Public Expenditure Stimulus on Short-Term Growth: The eventual impact of 
stimulus programs on short-term growth remains controversial.  Although a meta-
analysis by the IMF reveals a range of multipliers of fiscal stimulus impact (typically 
from 0.6 to 1.4), the Fund’s Research Unit has just concluded that a potential return of $3 
could be expected from each $1 of investment in stimulus, assuming a global response, 
monetary accommodation and a focus on a mix of investment and targeted transfers.  
There is also a potential cost for governments of doing nothing in the face of recession.  
Consumer propensity to spend and the confidence that consumers have in future 
economic activity may be an important variable that drives recovery.  As tangible, job-
creating and highly visible expenditures, infrastructure investment may help to boost 
consumer confidence in a government’s responsiveness to crisis. 
 




  There is relatively positive 
consensus about the long-term benefits to growth and poverty alleviation of infrastructure 
investment.  A recent meta-analysis by the Bank shows many more positive results than 
negative results related to impacts of infrastructure stock and quality on aggregate growth 
as well as micro-level factors.  OECD analysis produces similar results, showing higher 
impacts in those countries with lower baselines of infrastructure stock and performance. 
                                                 
35  Private financial flows into the region’s infrastructure sectors totaled about $20 billion dollars in 2008, 
not including commitments to the expansion of the Panama Canal. 
36    Although US estimates from highway construction more than double the employment generation 
estimates when induced jobs are added, it should be remembered that other  forms of transfers from 
government—tax credits, CCTs, food stamps—would also generate induced employment 
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Annex 1: Hourly Rate Estimates 
 
The direct and indirect employment generation  estimates are higly sensitive to assumptions 
regarding wages. Wages in the construction sector, as a benchmark, vary significantly across the 
countries. The following tables present these figures for several countries. For those in South 
America,  the range in wages in this sector is between $1.39  and  $4.28  per hour, excluding 
benefits.  The (unweighted) average of these wages is $2.55 per hour. In general, benefits 
packages are significantly heterogeneous in the region but roughly they are 30 percent in top of 
the net salary. Using this assumption, we obtain a gross salary of $3.31 per hour without 
including other indirect labor costs that are much harder to estimate.  Thus, for the purposes of 
the estimates, we assumed a standardized value of $3.00 per hour that includes all the related 
direct labor costs such as health and pension packages.   
 
Table A1: Minimum Wages and Average Wages in the Whole Economy and in the Construction 
Sector – South America. 
 
 
Table A2: Minimum Wages and Average Wages in the Whole Economy and in the Construction 
Sector – Central America and the Caribbean. 
 
Note: The subregional averages correspond to the simple averages across the countries in the the group with available 
information. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based in ILO’s documents and several country sources. 
 
Year of
Reference Minimum Average Construct. Minimum Average Construct. Minimum Average Construct.
Argentina 2007 1.29 n.a. n.a. 10.34 n.a. n.a. 258.43 n.a. n.a.
Bolivia 2007 0.42 n.a. 1.39 3.34 n.a. 11.14 66.87 n.a. 222.77
Brazil 2009 1.33 n.a. 2.92 10.67 n.a. 23.39 213.30 n.a. 467.89
Chile 2006 1.59 n.a. 3.18 12.73 n.a. 25.41 254.58 n.a. 508.29
Colombia 2007 1.30 1.98 1.64 10.43 15.82 13.13 208.68 316.49 262.68
Ecuador 2007 0.75 n.a. 1.06 6.00 n.a. n.a. 120.00 n.a. n.a.
Mexico 2007 0.61 2.70 3.39 4.88 21.63 6.62 97.60 432.69 546.91
Peru 2007 1.00 n.a. 4.28 5.33 n.a. 12.22 159.85 n.a. 685.34
Uruguay 2007 0.82 n.a. n.a. 6.55 n.a. n.a. 131.01 n.a. n.a.
Venezuela 2007 1.79 n.a. n.a. 9.54 n.a. n.a. 286.35 n.a. n.a.
Avg South America 1.09 2.34 2.55 7.98 18.73 15.32 179.67 374.59 448.98
Hourly Daily Monthly
Year of
Reference Minimum Average Construct. Minimum Average Construct. Minimum Average Construct.
Costa Rica 2007 1.04 2.36 1.68 8.31 18.92 13.47 166.15 378.34 269.45
Cuba 2006 1.52 2.61 n.a. 12.15 20.90 n.a. 243.01 417.97 n.a.
Dominican Rep. 2004 0.24 0.99 1.74 1.90 7.92 13.94 37.99 158.33 278.75
El Salvador 2007 0.65 1.55 1.42 5.16 12.37 11.37 103.20 247.40 227.30
Guatemala 2006 0.74 1.73 n.a. 5.92 13.80 n.a. 118.38 276.02 n.a.
Nicaragua 2007 0.24 1.75 0.37 1.94 14.02 2.95 38.88 280.36 89.81
Panama 2007 0.89 2.30 2.00 7.12 18.40 16.00 142.40 368.00 320.00
CA and the Caribe 0.76 1.90 1.44 6.07 15.19 11.55 121.43 303.78 237.06
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